CVE-2026-42449: n8n-MCP SSRF Bypasses IPv6 Checks
A critical Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability, CVE-2026-42449, has been identified in n8n-MCP versions 2.47.4 through 2.47.13. This flaw allows attackers to bypass existing IPv4-based SSRF protection mechanisms by using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, such as http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]. This circumvents checks designed to block access to cloud metadata endpoints, RFC1918 private networks, and localhost services.
According to the National Vulnerability Database, an attacker capable of supplying an n8nApiUrl value can coerce the server into issuing HTTP requests to internal resources. Crucially, this is a non-blind SSRF, meaning response bodies are returned directly to the attacker. Furthermore, the x-n8n-api-key header, containing the n8nApiKey, is forwarded to the attacker-controlled target, risking API key compromise.
The vulnerability affects projects embedding n8n-mcp as an SDK using N8NDocumentationMCPServer or N8NMCPEngine with user-supplied InstanceContext. The issue is resolved in version 2.47.14. For those unable to upgrade immediately, the National Vulnerability Database recommends validating URLs before passing them to the SDK, restricting egress at the network layer, and rejecting user-controlled n8nApiUrl values.
What This Means For You
- If your organization uses n8n-MCP in an embedded SDK configuration, you are exposed. This isn't just a theoretical bypass; it's a direct route to sensitive internal resources and API keys. Patch to version 2.47.14 immediately. If you can't, implement strict URL validation and egress filtering now. Assume an attacker will leverage this for lateral movement and credential theft.
Related ATT&CK Techniques
🛡️ Detection Rules
4 rules · 6 SIEM formats4 detection rules auto-generated for this incident, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. Sigma YAML is free — export to any SIEM format via the Intel Bot.
CVE-2026-42449: n8n-MCP SSRF via IPv6 Mapped Address to Cloud Metadata
title: CVE-2026-42449: n8n-MCP SSRF via IPv6 Mapped Address to Cloud Metadata
id: scw-2026-05-07-ai-1
status: experimental
level: critical
description: |
Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2026-42449 by sending requests to the n8n-MCP server where the n8nApiUrl parameter is set to an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address targeting cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]). This bypasses SSRF protections and allows attackers to access sensitive cloud instance information.
author: SCW Feed Engine (AI-generated)
date: 2026-05-07
references:
- https://shimiscyberworld.com/posts/nvd-CVE-2026-42449/
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
cs-uri|contains:
- '[::ffff:169.254.169.254]'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity
Source: Shimi's Cyber World · License & reuse
Indicators of Compromise
| ID | Type | Indicator |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-42449 | SSRF | n8n-MCP versions 2.47.4 through 2.47.13 |
| CVE-2026-42449 | SSRF | Vulnerable component: N8NDocumentationMCPServer constructor, getN8nApiClient(), validateInstanceContext(), SSRFProtection.validateUrlSync() |
| CVE-2026-42449 | SSRF | Attack vector: IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (e.g., http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]) bypassing URL validation |
| CVE-2026-42449 | Information Disclosure | Exposure of n8nApiKey via x-n8n-api-key header to attacker-controlled target |
| CVE-2026-42449 | SSRF | Affected deployments embedding n8n-mcp as an SDK using N8NDocumentationMCPServer or N8NMCPEngine with user-supplied InstanceContext |
Source & Attribution
| Source Platform | NVD |
| Channel | National Vulnerability Database |
| Published | May 08, 2026 at 00:16 UTC |
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